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Abstract 
 
Indonesia is the world’s largest archipelago, 2/3 of the country is covered by sea. But due to many factors a lot of ship 
accidents occurred every year, and claiming a large number of casualties. Efforts have been done to improve the safety of 
domestic sea transportation, as the result to be fully compliance to the SOLAS (Safety Of Live At Sea) regulations 
regarding to the IMO (International Maritime Organization) convention, worsen by varying sea and cargo characteristic, 
and low educated passengers, they are very vulnerable to accidents. There are so many accidents in sea transportation in 
Indonesia, especially in 2005-2010 is due to human errors and only a few caused by natural factors and others. Most of 
the accidents occur due to the low awareness of the aspects of security and safety. Equipment’s and system on board ship, 
will not remain safe or reliable if they are not maintained. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) approach is chosen 
as a risk assessment methodology in this paper to synthesize the potential failure modes and their associated causes for 
product design, especially in ship diesel engine. In this paper, the study proposes the fuel oil system in the ship diesel 
engine. Fuel oil system is extremely important system on a ship which is designed to supply clean fuel oil to main engine, 
diesel generators and emergency diesel generators. FMEA is an effective tool or technique used for identifying possible 
failures and mitigating their effects. In various life cycle phase of diesel engine, FMEA activities are executed, and 
detailed FMEA documents are usually used as reference. Design changes can be executed according to the existing 
FMEA documents, especially for the most dangerous failure modes with high prevention difficulty. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The lack of the ship as a means of transport caused by unplanned maintenance system resulted in a decrease 
of existing equipment performance on his boat in particular motor carrier. Treatment cannot be regarded as 
excluded because when in the process performance of a motor carrier does not do care, then the motor carriers 
will decline slowly but surely. A motor carrier in ship usually called diesel engines. A diesel engines are well 
known for their operational robustness and efficient performance. These attributes make them a leading choice 
for prime movers in critical  industrial, and mobility applications. Despite the diesel engine's known reliability, 
there are some operational issues that justify monitoring critical engine components and subsystems in order to 
increase the overall availability and readiness of diesel-powered systems. Moreover, engines typically 
constitute a significant fraction (1/10-1/5) of the acquisition cost and a comparable fraction of the life cycle 
cost for mobility applications, thereby providing the motivation for engine condition monitoring on the basis of 
reducing life cycle costs. Review of the available literature indicates that the fuel injection and cooling 
subsystems are among the most problematic on diesel engines contributing to reduced readiness and increased 
maintenance costs. These faults can be addressed and studied using scaled testing to build the necessary 
knowledge base to quickly transition the methods to full-scale, more costly diesel engines (Banks, et al 2001). 
Diesel engines play major roles in automotive and stationary applications (Nunney, 1998). The life cycle 
cost of diesel engine is largely determined by the design phase, and its inherent reliability is also heavily 
influenced by this phase. In order to improve the reliability of the engine, similar diesel engine which have 
detailed FMEA (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis) documents are usually used as references for priority 
identification and risk estimation of failures model in FMEA.  
FMEA is a methodology designed to identify potential failure modes for the product, to assess the risk 
associated with those failure modes, to rank the issues in term of importance, and to carry out corrective 
actions to address the most serious failure modes. Failure modes may be introduced in design, manufacture, 
and/or usage, and can be potential or actual. Effects analysis refers to studying the consequences of those 
failures. FMEA is widely used in the manufacturing industry in whole life cycle of a product (Bowles & 
Bonnell, 1998). 
In diesel engine design and manufacturing, it is common to perform FMEA. The aim of diesel engine 
FMEA is to find potential failure modes and implement design changes, to eliminate critical failure modes, and 
to decrease the maintenance cost when the engine is put into use.  
 
2.  Problem Statement 
 
Analysed of the caused of accidents involving complex technological systems clearly indicates that a small 
percentage of the major accidents are caused by failures of the systems (something less than 20%). Rather, the 
accidents that caused by unanticipated actions of people have undesirable outcomes (something more than 80 
%). These an unanticipated actions and outcomes can have root source in design, construction, operation, and 
maintenance.  
Perrow (1999) states that the error inducing character of the system in shipping lies in the social 
organization of the personnel on board, economic pressure, the structure of industry and insurance and 
difficulties in international regulation. This review examines the current status of safety in the maritime 
industry and the human factors that may contribute to the causal chain in shipping accidents. There is a 
particular combination of demand characteristic of the maritime industry such as fatigue, stress, work pressure, 
communication, environmental factors, and long periods of time away from home, which could be potential 
contributors.  Exemplifying that in shipping “there are a number of workplace dangers in combination, 
something rare in other industries” (Mc Namara, et al, 2000).   
Maintenance, repair, and overhaul of complex industrial and marine systems have received considerable 
attention in the last decades, due to the high amounts of capital invested and the high availability rates 
requested. Especially to prevent the risky situations and to increase systems reliability on board ships, the 
prestigious marine engine manufacturers and ship operators have continuously evidence gathered from the past 
experiences.   
Current methods used to assess system reliability are focused primarily on the hardware component of the 
system. At one end of the spectrum are the qualitative methods that use historical and experimental hardware 
fail data to predict future failure rates and how various hardware can fail by using Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis (FMEA). By using FMEA we could identify where and how it might fail human factor tabulation 
data, assessing the relative impact of different failures, and identifying the parts of the process most in need of 
improvement with factor analysis. We can make the worksheet data after determining the failure mode with the 
validation matrix.  
In this paper, the ship has an important role in the shipping industry, and need to do an analysis of engine 
system service. This is done to prevent the failure of components within the system that could cause a failure 
of the punitive damage portion of the ship's functions will ultimately lead to decreased safety level and can 
endanger passengers and cargo transported even ships nearby. Bad fuel distribution system on a ship caused a 
breakdown in the fuel to the main engines. This resulted in a delay in the ship's anchor, necessitating regular 
care and held continue on the fuel distribution system. A technique used to identify, prioritize and eliminate 
potential failure in systems used for reviewing a process or operation in which systematically acquainted with 
FMEA. FMEA is used as a risk assessment technique which synthesizes failure modes in order to identify 
early response and to take appropriate actions into account. As a case application, crucial troubles in fuel oil 
systems on board ship are investigated deeply to adopt an effective preventive maintenance strategy for fuel oil 
system in marine diesel engine. 
 
3.  Ship Accident In Indonesia 
 
Indonesia is the maritime area that has a unique-features in terms of its transport system, especially the 
technical and economic aspects, that should be examined more deeply because the age of the current fleet are 
mostly old, this can cause damage that is not entirely unexpected and it may also affect safety of other ships.  
From the report of Trend Analysis of Sea Accident by PT. Trans Asia Konsultan in year 2009, it states that 
the vessel must meet the requirements of the materials, the construction of buildings, machinery, and the 
electrification, governance, stability and structure of radio equipment/ship's electronics, accredited by a 
certificate, that is obviously required after the inspection and testing. Vessels whose condition is excellent, and 
in accordance with the legal provisions, and declared fit to sail, would be safe to take people and goods, 
otherwise the ship which is in questionable when the condition is likely to find resistance from maritime 
transport authority. If the ship was damaged during the trip, it will require additional costs, such as the 
exploitation of costs due to delay. It is certainly not an easy thing to maintain. The State of the vessel which 
complies with the requirements and security, the prevention of pollution, control of cargo, the health and well-
being of the crew, all of these require additional capital. In addition, companies in business from cruise ships 
also require full cooperation and assistance of the shipyards, while the current conditions of the shipyards are 
also faced with lethargy. Therefore, the Government has a rule to play in devising desirable policy, particularly 
the aspects of the capital and the creation of a favourable business climate, so that transport and shipbuilding 
company implement rehabilitation, replacement and expansion of the current fleet. 
Accidents occurring in sea, rivers, lakes, and crossing that reached Marine Court in 2005-2010 was mostly 
due to human error (65%), and only a few accidents in the waters caused by natural factors (Danny & 
Shariman, 2011). Given the reasons mentioned above, all accidents can be minimized if prevention efforts are 
seriously performed by all parties so as not to stumble on the same stone. Water transport accidents occur 
mainly due to overcrowding and navigation system, which is characterized by a large number of passengers 
and goods compared to the draft Commission. For passengers who do not have the expertise and skills in 
emergency situations, it is important to note that users of the waterway in the category of vulnerable population 
groups. Efforts to ensure the safety of passengers and crew must be considered as a serious issue, including this 
trivial security equipment such as buoys. Current conditions, many ships that do not have safety equipment 
should be able to buoy passengers and crew when the vessel having accident. Most of the accidents occur due 
to the low awareness on the aspects of security and safety of the crew. The figures differ from the manifest of 
passengers and number of passengers on the ground become common place. Transportation is the lifeblood of 
society and the economy in Indonesia. Transportation development activities in Indonesia are out of various 
dimensions (marine transport and others) and increasing. This is an  impacts of economic activity and socio-
cultural activities and community. In addition, the process of regulatory reform in the field of national 
transportation deregulation has also triggered an increase in transport activity. To understand fully that human 
consciousness towards the preservation of the environment are increasingly high, so that sea transportation 
accidents which can cause damage to the environment (pollution) should be a significant consideration. In 
order to further integrate transport infrastructure and facilities that meet the requirements of security and safety 
of transport, it is necessary to make a standardization of regulation system and procedures, as well as human 
resource professionals to realize the service organization of the transport and works in order to hold everything 
intact. Then it is necessary to have a system of good governance, where Governments have function in the 
transportation services which include coaching in the aspects of setting up, monitoring and controlling the 
system (PT. Trans Asia Konsultan, 2009). 
 
3.1 Indonesian Ship Accident Data (2005-2010) 
 
The accident happened on a river, lake, and river crossings that are up to the Marine Court over voyage 
caused by human error, and just a little accident in the waters caused by natural factors. Tracing the reason 
mentioned above should all the events of the accident can be minimized while there are preventive efforts from 
all parties so as not to stumble on the same stone. As the image comparison between amphibious insertions 
accidents caused by human error and natural factors can be seen in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1: Ship Accidents Factor 
A lot of ship accidents occurred every year on Indonesia water, described in Table 1. 
 
 
 
                       Table 1: Number of Ship Accident According to Marine Court Decision 2005-2010 
                           
 
No 
 
Description 
 
Quantity 
 
2005 
  
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
  
Accidents 
Type  
 
  
          
1 Sunk Accidents 7  12 9 13 11 4 
2 Collision Accidents 10  9 4 15 9 2 
3 Grounded Accidents 5  5 5 2 3 6 
4 Fired Accidents 5  6 9 4 5 5 
5 Others Accidents 2  6 5 1 5 2 
  Total   29       38 32 35 33 19 
                Source: Marine Court, Secretary General, Ministry of Transportation (2011) 
 
4.   Safety of the Ship 
4.1 Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) of the Ship 
Current models of Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) is a model widely used to analyse accidents at sea 
where the safety assessment is based on the model risk. Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) was developed by 
the UK Marine Safety Agency (1992). The concept of the FSA adopted by IMO in the form Guidelines to 
Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) through memorandum MSC/Circ. 1023-MEPC/Circ. 392 (IMO, 2002) and 
updated through 2006 included an evaluation of FSA Guidelines risk criteria. The FSA is basically put their 
risk factors, in which the process is systematically using the scientific method approach. 
International Maritime Organization (IMO), Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) in 1995 decided to adopt 
the concept of FSA. This was done in the hope of improving the IMO rule-making process, and thus further 
enhancing the safety of shipping. As stated by Wang (2001), it is considered that ‘‘Marine safety may be 
significantly improved by introducing a formal ‘goal-setting’ safety assessment approach so that the challenge 
of new technologies and their application to ship design and operation may be dealt with properly’’. For a more 
specific discussion on the expected benefits of the FSA as a regulatory tool, and as a potential framework for 
safety assurance in shipping companies, the reader is referred to MSA (1993),Wang (2001) and Peachey 
(2002). Following the development and introduction of the FSA method, interim guidelines for FSA 
application were issued by IMO (1997a) to describe and explain the new method and to support its application 
and further development in practice. Since that time, several FSA trial applications and case studies have been 
carried out in various IMO member states around the world. Some of the studies have been issued in direct 
support for the formulation of new IMO safety regulations (e.g. DNV (Det Norke Veritas), 1997a; IMO, 
1997b, 2000a,b), while in some other studies the objective has been to provide the justification for rule 
amendments or provisions allowing deviation/exemptions from a particular rule (e.g. DNV, 1997b). For a 
further discussion on ways of FSA applications, see Wang (2001). 
Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) is a rational and systematic process for the proactive management of 
safety based on principles of hazard identification, risk analysis and cost-effectiveness evaluation of the efforts 
in controlling the risks. FSA can be used as a tool to help in the development of new safety regulations or in 
analysing an existing set of regulations, and thus achieve a balance between various technical and operational 
issues, including human element and costs. The characterization of hazards and risks should be both qualitative 
and quantitative, consistent with the available data, and should be broad enough to include the range of options 
for reduction of risks. A typical FSA exercise in a ship type according to the IMO Guideline would proceed as 
follows: 
Problem definition: 
The problem under analysis and its boundaries should be carefully defined. While defining the problem, the 
following parameters may be considered relevant;  
a) Ship category (e.g. type, length or gross tonnage, new or existing) 
b) Ship systems (e.g. type layout, subdivision, propulsion,) 
c) Ship operation (e.g. in ports and/or during navigation) 
d) Accident category (e.g. collision, explosion, fire) 
e) Risk category (e.g. injuries and/or fatalities to passengers and crew, environmental impact, damage to ship 
or port). 
      By considering the characteristic of the ship, a formal safety assessment of the ship is described in detail in 
this chapter regarding by IMO. FSA is a structured and systematic methodology, aimed at enhancing maritime 
safety, including protection of life, health, the marine environment and property, by using risk analysis and 
cost benefit assessment. FSA can be used as a tool to help in the evaluation of new regulations for maritime 
safety and protection of the marine environment or in making a comparison between existing and possibly 
improved regulations, with a view to achieving a balance between the various technical and operational issues, 
including the human element, and between maritime safety or protection of the marine environment and costs.  
      FSA consists of five steps: 
1. Identification of hazards (a list of all relevant accident scenarios with potential causes and outcomes);  
2. Assessment of risks (evaluation of risk factors);  
3. Risk control options (devising regulatory measures to control and reduce the identified risks);  
4. Cost benefit assessment (determining cost effectiveness of each risk control option); and  
5. Recommendations for decision-making (information about the hazards, their associated risks and the cost 
effectiveness of alternative risk control options is provided).  
In simple terms, these steps can be reduced to: 
1. What might go wrong? = identification of hazards (a list of all relevant accident scenarios with potential 
causes and outcomes)  
2. How bad and how likely? = assessment of risks (evaluation of risk factors);  
3. Can matters be improved? = risk control options (devising regulatory measures to control and reduce the 
identified risks)  
4. What would it cost and how much better would it be? = cost benefit assessment (determining cost 
effectiveness of each risk control option);  
5. What actions should be taken? = recommendations for decision-making (information about the hazards, 
their associated risks and the cost effectiveness of alternative risk control options is provided).  
It is equally admitted however, that the application of absolute numerical risk criteria may not always be 
appropriate as the whole process of risk assessment involves uncertainties. Furthermore, opinions on 
acceptable numerical risk criteria may differentiate between individuals and societies with different cultures, 
experience and mentalities. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Information Flow in FSA Process 
 
Source: Interim Report of Collaborative FSA Studies between Indian Register of Shipping, China 
Classification Society, Korean Register of Shipping and Class NK., 2002 
 
Prior to application of the FSA steps additional information would require to be compiled on the following: 
a) Identification of existing design concepts and review of existing rules/regulations 
b) Identification of existing operational procedures/concepts 
c) Compilation of materials under consideration and their properties. 
d) Identification of involved parties responsible/liable for safety. 
In general, the problem under consideration should be characterized by a number of functions. Where the 
problem refers to a type of ship, these functions include carriage of payload, emergency response, 
communication, manoeuvrability etc. Where the problem relates to a type of hazard, for instance Fire, the 
functions include prevention, detection, alarm, containment, escape, suppression etc. It is imperative that a 
comprehensive view is taken of the ship ‘hardware’ (i.e. technical & engineering system) dynamically 
integrated to the ‘software’ (i.e. human behaviour governed by organization & management infrastructure). 
 
4.2    FMEA Analysis 
Initially used by the U.S military after World War II as a process tool, FMEA gradually spread into 
industry. It became widely known within the quality community as a total quality management tool in the 
1980s and as a Six Sigma tool in the 1990s. A team should apply FMEA to perform risk assessment to see 
what the customer will experience if a key process input (X) were to fail. The team should then take action to 
minimize risk and document processes and improvement activities. FMEA is living document that should be 
reviewed and updated whenever the process is changed (Jogger, 2002). It can be used in the define phase of the 
define, measure, analyse improve and control strategy as a voice of the customer input, but is more commonly 
created in the measure phase, updated in the analyse and improve phases and is a vital element of the control 
phase. FMEA is one of the most efficient low-risk tools for prevention of problems and for identification of 
more efficacious solutions, in cost terms, in order to prevent such problems. 
To develop the FMEA, initially was done a survey on the functions of each component, as well as on its 
failure modes and effects. Were been used, as support for the analysis, the system textual description, 
contained in the technical operation instructions, the fault registers in the abnormality cards (service orders for 
maintenance) of the plant, the maintenance plans currently used and the instrumentation descriptions of the 
equipment and components. It was also performed a brainstorming in a join into the plant operators, so that it 
was possible to get with more details about the description of the possible failures of each component. 
For the analysis, the data was taken from the field data, from the ship KM (Kapal Motor) Karisma in 
Table 2 the specification data from the ship and main engine specification. 
 
Table 2:  Data Spec and Main Engine of KM Karisma 
Principal Dimension Description 
Gross Tonnage 2059 GT 
LWT (Light Weigh Tonnage) 1329 Ton 
LOA / LPP (Length of All) / (Length  
Between Perpendicular) 
88,636 / 81,50 m 
Breadth 13 m 
Draft 5,409 m 
Velocity 10 Knot 
Main Engine MAN B&W 6S26MC 
HP / Kw / R.P.M 2382 PS / 1752 / 250 
Crews 21 peoples 
Year Making- Country Made 1990 – South Korea  
                     Main Engine Spec 
1 No. Of Set :  1 Set 
2 Type : Marine Use, Vertical In-Line  Two (2) 
Stroke 
     Single Acting, Direct Reversible 
Crosshead 
     Diesel Engine With Exhaust 
Turbocharger 
3 Model : MAN B&W 6 S26MC 
4 Rating : MCR : 2400 BHP at 250 RPM 
     CSR : 2160 BHP at 241,4 RPM 
     OR : 2648 BHP at 258 RPM 
5 Direction of Rotation : Clock Wise Viewed From After 
6 Starting : Compresed air max 30 Kg/cm^2 
7 Using Of Fuel Oil : HFO 
8 Fuel Oil Consumption : 130g/BHP.hr 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: FMEA of Effect of Main Engine 
System  : Main Engine Suporting System  
Indenture Level  : Fuel Oil System   
Reference Drawing : Schematic Piping Diagram KM.Karisma  
Mission : Fuel Oil System Failure  
   
Iden 
tifica
tion 
No. 
Item/Functional 
Identification 
(Nomenclature) 
Function 
Failure Modes 
and Causes 
Mission 
Phase/ 
Operational 
Mode 
Failure Effects 
Failure 
Detection 
Method 
Effect For 
M/E 
Critical Local effects 
Next 
Higher 
Effects 
End effects 
1 Storage Tank  
Fuel oil 
storage 
Leakage 
Fuel oil 
supply less Fuel losses Fire hazard 
Danger of 
explosion 
Direct 
observation 
 No 
 
Clogged 
Fuel oil 
supply less Excess charge Fire hazard 
Danger of 
explosion 
Direct 
observation 
2 Transfer Pump  
Drain the 
fuel oil 
from 
service tank 
to main 
engine 
 
Raise the 
pressure 
low of fuel 
oil 
Less pressure 
and the 
resulting lack of 
capacity.(Low 
output) 
(OREDA 2002) 
Fuel oil 
supply less Reduce the 
fuel flow and 
the flow 
become small  
The supply 
of fuel to 
another 
sub-system 
disturbed 
Main engine 
performance 
decrease 
Pressure 
indicator 
Yes  
Noise and 
vibration on 
pump 
(Vibration and 
Noise) (OREDA 
2002) 
Fuel oil 
supply less 
Damaged 
pumping fast 
The supply 
of fuel to 
the main 
engine 
disturbed 
Main engine 
performance 
decreased 
Direct 
observation 
Leakage on 
pump seal 
(Leakage) 
(OREDA 2002) 
Fuel oil 
supply less 
Damaged 
pumping fast 
The supply 
of fuel to 
the main 
engine 
disturbed 
Main engine 
performance 
decreased 
Direct 
observation 
Pump cannot 
spin 
(Breakdown) 
(OREDA 2002) 
Fuel oil 
supply less Damaged 
pumping fast 
The fuel 
supply is 
cut off. 
Main engine 
cannot 
operating 
Direct 
observation 
3 Settling Tank  
Shelter 
early and 
heating fuel 
oil 
Leakage 
Fuel oil 
supply less 
Fuel losses Fire hazard 
Danger of 
explosion 
Direct 
observation 
 No 
4 Purifier  
Separate 
the fuel 
oilfrom 
water and 
dirt 
Purifier 
cleaning is bad 
Fuel oil 
viscosity is 
not enough 
Purity levels 
of fuel does 
not qualify 
Viscosity 
ineligible 
Main engine 
burning not 
perfect 
Water 
transducer 
Direct 
observation 
Yes  
5 
De-Aerator 
chamber 
Regulating 
the flow of 
fuel oil to 
the main 
engine 
The seal has 
corrosion and 
leakage 
Seal tight 
decreased 
The unit 
cannot be 
spinning as 
well as the 
presence of 
fluid out of 
the seal unit 
Increasing 
the pressure 
on the pipe 
leading to 
the main 
engine 
Low fuel 
quality as 
well as a 
decline in 
performance 
of main 
engine 
Direct 
observation 
Yes  
6 Service Tank  
A place of 
shelter fuel 
advanced 
that ready 
to use 
Leakage 
Fuel oil 
supply less 
Fuel losses Fire hazard 
Danger of 
explosion 
Direct 
observation 
 No 
 
Leakage 
Fuel oil 
supply less 
Excess charge Fire hazard 
Danger of 
explosion 
Direct 
observation 
7 Supply Pump  
Flow the 
fuel from 
service tank 
to main 
engine 
 
 
 
Raise the 
pressure 
flow of fuel 
oil 
Impeller get 
corrosion and 
erosion 
Cavitation 
happened 
Pump leakage 
(OREDA 2002) 
 Less pressure  
Fuel supply 
become 
small, 
Overheat 
pump, 
Speed up the 
wear of pump  
 
Fuel supply 
to another 
system 
disturbed 
Fuel oil 
supply to 
main engine 
stopped 
 Pressure 
indicator 
Yes  
Section and 
discharge clogged 
Electric supply 
less 
Electric voltage 
unstable 
 Less pressure  
May cause 
damage on 
pump 
Bearing will 
quickly to 
wear 
Lack of 
fuel 
discharge 
for main 
engine 
Fuel oil 
supply to 
main engine 
stopped 
Flow 
indicator, 
Voltmeter 
Driving the pump 
get overload 
(OREDA 2002) 
The pump 
vibrates and the 
sound which is 
very 
noisy(Vibration 
and Noise) 
(OREDA 2002) 
The particles 
enter into a 
pump, 
Cavitation 
happened. 
Pump 
foundation is 
not good 
Damaged 
pumping fast  
Fuel supply 
to main 
engine 
disturbed 
Fuel oil 
supply to 
main engine 
stopped Direct 
observation 
The pump is 
spinning and 
suddenly 
stopped 
(Breakdown) 
(OREDA 2002) 
The presence of 
impurities 
which enters 
into a pump, 
Deformation 
occurs due to 
the heat so that 
the impeller 
was broken 
Damaged 
pumping fast  
Fuel supply 
terminated 
Fuel oil 
supply to 
main engine 
stopped 
Direct 
observation 
8 
Filter 1 
Filter 2 
To filter the 
impurities in 
fuel oil 
Filter clogged 
by the dirt 
Any dirt that 
cannot be 
cleaned 
Damaged 
filter  
The fuel oil 
can not 
flow 
Fuel oil 
supply to 
main engine 
stopped 
Viscometer  
Flow meter 
Yes  
The filter not 
maximum 
Any dirt that 
cannot be 
cleaned 
Dirty fuel oil 
Damaged 
pump 
Fuel supply to 
main engine 
stopped 
Viscometer  
Flow meter 
9 
Drain Tank  
 
Holding 
excess fuel 
oil from the 
main engine 
Leakage 
Plate 
corrosion 
Fuel losses Fire hazard 
Danger of 
explosion 
Direct 
observation 
 
No 
 
 
 
Table 4: FMEA Severity Class of Fuel Oil System 
          
System  : General Service System Of Main Engine  
Indenture Level  : Sub System  
Mission : Fuel Oil System Failure  
Identifi
cation 
No. 
Item/Functi
onal 
Identificati
on 
(Nomenclat
ure) 
Function 
Failure 
Modes and 
Causes 
Mission 
Phase/ 
Operational 
Mode 
Failure Effects 
Failure 
Detection 
Method 
Compensating 
Provisions 
Severity 
Class Local 
effects 
Next 
Higher 
Effects 
End effects 
 FO-01 
Storage 
Tank  
Fuel oil 
storage 
Leakage 
Fuel Oil 
supply less 
Fuel oil 
losses 
Fire hazard 
Danger of 
explosion 
Direct 
observation 
Patching the 
leaking plate 
 Catastrophic 
Clogged 
Fuel Oil 
supply less 
Excess 
charge 
Fire hazard 
Danger of 
explosion 
Direct 
observation 
Patching the 
leaking plate 
 FO-02 
Transfer 
Pump  
Drain fuel 
oil from 
service tank 
to main 
engine 
 
Raise the 
pressure 
flow of fuel 
oil 
Less 
pressure 
and the 
resulting 
lack of 
capacity 
Fuel Oil 
supply less  
The flow of 
fuel oil 
decreased, 
Overheat 
pump, 
Speed up 
the wearing 
of a pump 
The supply 
of fuel oil 
to another 
sub-system 
disturbed 
Main 
engine 
performanc
e decrease 
Pressure 
indicator 
Changing the 
impeller,  
Opening suction 
valve, Checking 
and fixing the  
part contained air 
to go in,  
Treatment fuel oil 
in order to have 
the right viscosity, 
Setting again flow 
regulating valve 
 Critical 
The pump 
vibrates 
and the 
sound is 
very noisy 
Fuel Oil 
supply less 
Damage 
pumping 
fast 
The supply 
of fuel oil 
to main 
engine 
disturbed 
Main 
engine 
performanc
e decrease 
Direct 
observation 
Cleaning the 
suction valve and 
discharge,  
Adjusting the 
power enters to 
the pump needs,  
Repairing the 
pump foundation, 
tighten the bolt 
fastener,  
Add the bearing 
on the foundation 
of the pump, 
Changing the 
Impeller  
The pump 
cannot spin 
Fuel Oil 
supply not 
enough  
Damage 
pumping 
fast 
The supply 
of  fuel oil 
cut by  
system 
failure 
Main 
engine 
failed to 
operate 
Direct 
observation 
Repairing if the 
damage of the 
pump minor, 
changing if major 
 FO-03 
Settling 
Tank  
Shelter 
early and 
heating fuel 
oil 
Leakage 
Fuel Oil 
supply not 
enough  
Fuel oil 
losses 
Fire hazard 
Danger of 
explosion 
Direct 
observation 
 Patching the 
leaking plate 
Catastrophic 
 Purifier  
Separate 
fuel oil 
from water 
and dirt 
Bad 
cleaning 
Temperatur
e 
controllers 
not 
functioning 
properly, 
Viscosity 
fuel not 
meet 
Fuel oil 
purity 
levels are 
not eligible 
Viscosity 
does not 
eligible 
Main 
engine 
burner 
imperfect 
Direct 
observation 
Checking the 
temperature 
controller. 
Checking the 
flow rate of the 
pump,  
Checking the 
valve 
Critical 
 FO-05 
De-Aerator 
Chamber 
Regulating 
the flow of 
fuel oil to 
main 
engine 
Rust Seal 
leakage 
Impermeabi
lity down 
Unit 
difficult or 
cannot be 
rotated, 
The 
presence of 
fluid out of 
the seal unit 
Pressure 
pipe to the 
engine 
increase 
Slow start,  
Fuel quality 
is not good, 
Knock 
misfiring, 
Poor Idle 
performanc
e engine 
Direct 
observation 
Cleaning the 
rust, 
Painting, 
Changing the 
broken seal 
Marginal 
 FO-06 
Service 
Tank  
A place of 
shelter fuel 
oil and 
prepared 
for use  
Leakage 
Fuel Oil 
supply less 
Fuel oil 
losses 
Fire hazard 
Danger of 
explosion 
Direct 
observation 
Patching the 
leaking plate 
 Catastrophic 
Outlet 
clogged 
Fuel Oil 
supply less 
Excess 
charge 
Fire hazard 
Danger of 
explosion 
Direct 
observation 
Cleaning the 
output line 
 FO-07 
Supply 
Pump  
Flow the 
fuel oil 
from 
service tank 
to main 
engine 
 
 
Raise the 
pressure 
flow of fuel 
oil 
Impeller get 
the corrosion 
and erosion, 
There is the 
air into the 
pump, 
Suction valve 
closed,  
Fuel oil 
viscosity is 
too high, 
Cavitation 
happened,  
The pump 
leakage 
 Less 
pressure 
The flow of 
fuel oil 
decreased,  
Overheat 
pump, 
Accelerate 
the wear 
and tear of 
the pump, 
Interface in 
separator is 
changed 
Fuel oil 
supply to 
another sub 
system 
disturbed 
Fuel oil 
supply to 
main 
engine 
stopped 
 Pressure 
indicator 
Changing the 
impeller,  
Opening the 
suction valve,  
Checking and 
repairing part 
contained air to 
go in, 
Fuel oil 
treatment for 
the right of 
viscosity,  
Setting again 
flow regulating 
valve  
Critical 
Section and 
discharge 
channel 
clogged, 
The supply 
voltage is 
reduced, 
Electric 
voltage is not 
stable, 
Pump does 
not meet the 
capacity 
specification, 
Driving the 
pump get 
overload 
Less 
pressure 
Can cause 
damage on 
a pump, 
Bearing 
will be 
broken 
Debit fuel 
oil to main 
engine not 
match 
Fuel oil 
supply to 
main 
engine 
stopped 
Flow 
indicator, 
Voltmeter 
Opening and 
cleaning the 
inlet and outlet 
valve, 
Cleaning the 
filter regularly 
Stabilizing 
supply voltage 
so that the 
pump's power 
needs are met 
 
The pump 
vibrates 
and the 
sound 
which is 
very noisy 
The 
existence of 
objects 
which enter 
into the 
pump, 
Resources 
used 
exceeded 
the 
maximum,  
Cavitation 
happened, 
The pump 
foundation 
is not good. 
Damaged 
pumping 
fast 
Fuel oil 
supply to 
main 
engine 
disturbed 
Fuel oil 
supply to 
main 
engine 
stopped 
Direct 
observation 
Cleaning the 
suction valve and 
discharge,  
Adjusting the 
power enters to 
the pump needs,  
Repairing the 
pump foundation, 
tighten the bolt 
fastener,  
Add the bearing 
on the 
foundation of 
the pump, 
Changing the 
Impeller 
The pump 
is spinning 
and 
suddenly 
stopped 
The 
existence of 
objects 
which enter 
into the 
pump, 
Deformation 
occurs due to 
the heat so 
that the 
impeller was 
broken 
Damaged 
pumping 
fast 
Fuel oil 
supply 
terminated, 
System 
failure 
Fuel oil 
supply to 
main 
engine 
stopped 
 
 
 
Direct 
observation 
Repairing if the 
damage of the 
pump minor, 
changing if 
major 
 FO-08 Filter  
To filter the 
impurities in 
fuel oil 
Filters 
clogged by 
dirt 
The 
presence of 
impurities 
that cannot 
clear 
Filter was 
 broken 
Fuel oil 
cannot flow 
Fuel oil 
supply to 
main 
engine 
stopped 
Direct 
observation 
Changing the 
filter  
Critical 
The filter 
not 
maximum 
Any dirt 
that cannot 
be cleaned 
Dirty fuel 
oil  
Damage 
pump 
Fuel oil 
supply to 
main 
engine 
stopped 
Viscometer
,  
Flow meter 
Changing the 
filter  
 FO-09 Drain Tank  
Holding 
excess fuel 
oil from the 
main engine 
Leakage 
The 
presence of 
corrosion 
and porous 
on the plate 
Fuel oil 
losses 
Fire  hazard 
Danger of 
explosion  
Direct 
observation 
Patching the 
leaking plate 
 Catastrophic 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
1. From the Indonesian ship accident data from 2005-2010 were 65% caused by human error, 24% caused by 
natural factor and 11% caused by other’s factor.  
2. From Table 3 there is a critical effect for Main Engine in Fuel Oil System: 
a. Transfer Pump: with the function for distributing the fuel to main engine from service tank and raise 
the fuel pressure.  
b. Purifier: with the function for separating fuel from the dirt and water. 
c. De-Aeration Tank: with the function for controlling the flow to main engine. 
d. Supply Pump: with the function for distributing the fuel oil from service tank to main engine and 
raising the fuel pressure. 
e. Filter: with the function for filter out the dirt from fuel. 
f. Circulating Tank: with the function for keeping the pressure in injection pump and circulating the fuel 
on the system to keep the viscosity and operational temperature 
g. Purifier Heater: with the function for raising the temperature and viscosity of the fuel  
h. Fuel Oil (FO) Line Heater: with the function for raising the temperature and viscosity of the fuel. 
3. In Table 4 there is Severity Class for Fuel Oil System Failure: 
i. Storage Tank : Catastrophic 
ii. Transfer Pump : Critical 
iii. Settling Tank : Catastrophic 
iv. Purifier  : Critical 
v. De-Aerator Tank : Marginal (Significant) 
vi. Service Tank : Catastrophic 
vii. Supply Pump : Critical 
viii. Filter  : Critical 
ix. Drain Tank : Catastrophic 
4.  The writer chose the FMEA of diesel engine because to prevent fire accident from happening. From the 
whole accident that happened in sea transportation accident, only fired ship could been used for this FMEA 
analysis. FMEA is a risk assessment technique with synthesizes the potential failure modes in order to 
identify early response and to take appropriate actions into account. FMEA is a systematic technique in 
analysing a form of failure and its emphasis on bottom-up approach. The point of the bottom-up approach 
here is an engineering analysis that was done starting from the equipment or components and then forward 
to the system level or a higher level. FMEA activity is aimed to get the most critical components or 
necessary component significant against the failure of the system of fuel. 
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